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Did	  Weimar	   fail?	  The	  Weimar	  complex	  has	   served	  generations	  of	   scholars	  as	  a	  
metal	   puzzle	   with	   a	   fiddly	   and	   predictable	   solution.	   In	   the	   last	   ten	   years,	  
however,	  ‘Weimar’	  has	  experienced	  a	  new	  lease	  of	  life,	  particularly	  in	  American	  
historiography.	   A	   common	   concern	   for	   democracy	   in	   political	   theory	   of	   the	  
twenty-­‐first	   century,	   along	   with	   trends	   towards	   transnational	   intellectual	  
history,	   has	   opened	   more	   rooms	   of	   the	   ivory	   tower	   towards	   each	   other.	  
Historians	  of	  Weimar	  culture	  trained	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  Peter	  Gay	  now	  listen	  to	  the	  
‘grandstudents’	   of	   émigré	   scholars	   of	   the	   Renaissance	   in	   Princeton,	   and	   even	  
those	  trained	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  Frankfurt	  School	  can	  chime	  in.	  	  
	  
Joining	   this	   growing	   conversation,	   which	   tends	   to	   circle	   around	   questions	   of	  
democratic	  stability,	  Udi	  Greenberg	  raises	  the	  question	  how	  much	  of	  Weimar	  is	  
still	   in	  us.	  No	   longer	  an	  emblem	  of	  democratic	   crisis,	   in	   this	  book,	  Weimar	  has	  
been	   rebranded	   as	   a	   marker	   of	   democratic	   reconstruction.	   Greenberg	   argues	  
that	   ‘Weimar’	  ideas	  of	  democracy	  and	  internationalism,	  developed	  in	  the	  1920s	  
and	  1930s	  and	   then	   taken	   to	   the	  United	  States	  by	  émigrés	  were	  revived	   in	   the	  
early	  Cold	  War	  culture	  of	  US-­‐sponsored	  postwar	  world	  order.	  But	  he	  also	  shows	  
the	  failure	  of	  Weimar	  democracy	  in	  a	  new	  light,	  analysing	  how	  US-­‐led	  campaigns	  
to	   secure	   democracy	   in	   Germany	   had	   started	  much	   earlier	   than	   the	   Cold	  War.	  
This	   common	   unity	   against	   threats	   such	   as	   Bolshevism	   united	   the	   allies	   with	  
their	   former	   enemies	   years	   before	   the	   Nazis’	   rise	   to	   power,	   whose	   own	  
contribution	  to	  anti-­‐communist	   thought	  was	  quickly	   forgotten	   in	   the	  Cold	  War.	  
In	  the	  interwar	  years,	  the	  Rockefeller	  foundation	  had	  invested	  heavily	  in	  funding	  
democratic	  think	  tanks	  in	  Germany,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  DAAD,	  the	  academic	  exchange	  
programmes.	  Greenberg	  demonstrates	  how	  the	  failure	  of	  democracy	  in	  Germany	  
could	   also	   be	   seen	   as	   an	   American	   failure	   to	   use	   soft	   power	   diplomacy	   and	  
financing	   effectively	   in	   the	   interwar	   years,	   two	   strategies	  which	  we	   commonly	  
with	  the	  Cold	  War.	  
	  
The	  major	  continuity	  this	  book	  identifies	  is	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  elites,	  both	  as	  a	  
social	  formation	  and	  as	  an	  idea,	  in	  the	  continuity	  between	  Weimar	  and	  Europe’s	  
second	   Postwar.	   Of	   five	   intellectual	   trajectories	   in	   focus	   in	   the	   book,	   each	   had	  
something	   to	   contribute	   to	   elite	   education	   before	   and	   after	   1945.	   Carl	   J.	  
Friedrich,	  an	  educational	  reformer,	  and	  Waldemar	  Gurian,	  a	  Jewish	  Catholic	  who	  
turned	   his	   particularly	   potent	   critique	   of	   Bolshevism	   into	   a	   critique	   of	   Nazi	  
totalitarianism,	   stand	  out	   as	  particularly	  pertinent	   case	   studies;	   a	   final	   chapter	  
on	  Hans	  Morgenthau	   also	   adds	   nuance	   to	   previous	   readings	   of	   his	   doctrine	   of	  
international	   law.	  They	   championed	   the	   idea	  of	   a	   controlled	  democracy	  driven	  
by	   the	   cultivation	   of	   appropriate	   elites,	   something	   which	   Alfred	   Weber,	   the	  
younger	  brother	  of	  Max	  Weber,	  had	  continued	  teaching	  after	  his	  brother’s	  death.	  
(p.	   128).	   I	  would	  have	   liked	   to	  hear	   a	   little	  more	  of	  Carl	   J.	   Friedrich’s	   activism	  
that	   yielded	   the	   publication	   of	   American	   Policy	   Toward	   Palestine	   (1944).	   His	  
otherwise	   technocratic	   notion	   of	   an	   elite	   obtained	   clearly	   colonial	   inflections,	  
which	  could	  have	  given	  the	  analysis	  even	  more	  depth.	  
	  
Granted,	   to	   see	  Leipzig-­‐born	  Carl	   J.	  Friedrich,	  a	   core	   thinker	   for	   this	  book,	  as	  a	  
‘Weimar’	  thinker,	  might	  require	  goodwill	  and	  imagination.	  As	  Greenberg	  himself	  
was	  well	  aware,	  Friedrich	  not	  only	  spent	  some	  years	  of	   the	  First	  World	  War	   in	  
the	  United	  States,	   a	   stay	   that	  had	   inspired	  him	   to	   found	   the	  German	  Academic	  
Exchange	  Programme	  in	  the	  1920s.	  He	  also	  assumed	  a	  lectureship	  at	  Harvard	  in	  
1926.	  But	  the	  point	  of	  the	  book	  was	  precisely	  that:	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  Weimar	  
was	  not	  the	  isolated	  experimental	  society	  that	  it	  was	  sometimes	  made	  out	  to	  be,	  
but	   that	   Germans	   of	   the	  Weimar	   era	   had	   a	   global	   influence	   even	   before	   their	  
involuntary	  emigration	  from	  Nazi	  Germany.	  
	  
Some	   of	   the	   slogans	   often	   mentioned	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Weimar	   Germany	   had	  
been	   questioned	   deserve	   to	   be	   explored	   with	   more	   historical	   acumen.	   For	  
instance,	  while	  the	  phrase	  ‘democracy	  without	  democrats’	  does	  indeed	  get	  used	  
in	  Jan-­‐Werner	  Müller’s	  Constitutional	  Patriotism	  (p.	  14n19),	  it	  was	  of	  much	  older	  
provenance,	   dating	   back	   to	   the	   critiques	   of	   France’s	   Third	   Republic.	   Another	  
issue	   I	   had	   concerns	   the	   book’s	   title.	   German	   thinkers	   may	   have	  
‘internationalised’	  the	  way	  the	  US	  thought	  about	  international	  affairs	  as	  well	  as	  
some	  US	  policy	  doctrines.	  Yet	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  the	  a	  ‘Weimar	  Century’	  remains	  
to	   be	   debated.	   I	   see	   much	   of	   the	   discussion	   as	   pointing	   to	   a	   much	   more	  
transnational	   story	   to	   which	   the	  model	   of	   a	  Weimar	   culture	   in	   exile	   does	   not	  
seem	  to	  apply.	  
	  
Taking	  the	  history	  of	  Weimar	  out	  of	  the	  history	  of	  Germany’s	  political	  deviance	  
and	   into	   the	   most	   normative	   outposts	   Western	   democracy	   is	   a	   bold	   step.	  
Greenberg	   takes	   it	   masterfully,	   in	   a	   way	   that	   is	   both	   enlightening	   and	  
challenging.	  This	  fits	  well	  with	  the	  current	  revival	  in	  the	  cultural	  and	  intellectual	  
history	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  It	  turns	  out	  that	  modern	  forms	  of	  democracy	  owe	  more	  
debts	   to	  Weimar	   Germany	   than	   has	   been	   previously	   accounted	   for.	   The	   good	  
news	   is:	   when	   the	   creditor	   goes	   bankrupt,	   sometimes	  we	   still	   get	   to	   keep	   the	  
funds.	  	  
	  
